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The only objection to such a procedure might be its cost. Distribution of
voting rights in the parent's stock to minority shareholders of the subsidiary in
proportion to their interest in that corporation would involve substantially the
same administrative costs as would the holding of a normal election by the
subsidiary with the parent excluded. While expense may be good reason to
refrain from routine use of the "pass through" technique, it should not deter
its employment when control of the parent corporation might thereby be
altered.
mon stock of the company held by their savings and profit-sharing pension fund. Shares held
by the fund were assigned to individual employee accounts in accordance with the interest of
each employee in the fund. The employees are now furnished with proxy statements prior to
elections. They submit their votes to an accounting firm which tabulates the results and
furnishes voting instructions to the trustees. In this manner, voting rights are accorded to the
beneficial owners of this large block of stock and the secrecy of the choice of individual
employees is maintained. See also note 4 supra.
RETROACTIVE DETERMINATION UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 4245 OF
A PRISONER'S INCOMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
In 1949, Congress added four new sections to chapter 313 of title 18,
U.S.C., which deals with mentally defective persons accused or convicted of
federal crimes.1 In adding section 4245, Congress provided a procedure for
vacating a sentence on the ground of mental incompetency at the time of the
trial. The section requires that the district court in which the prisoner was
convicted hold a hearing:
Whenever the Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall certify that... [the pris-
oner] has been examined by the board of examiners referred to in ... section 4241
and that there is probable cause to believe that... [he] was mentally incompetent at
the time of his trial, provided the issue of mental competency was not raised and
determined before or during said trial ....
1 Chapter 313 presently includes sections 4241-48. Sections 4241-43 were enacted into
positive law by the Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 855, which included all of Title 18. All
three were re-enactments, with minor changes, of the provisions of a 1930 act, 46 Stat. 272.
Sections 4244-48 were added in 1949, 63 Stat. 686 (1949). The House report explains the
addition of these sections:
"Existing Federal statutes prescribe no procedure whatever for determination of an
accused person's mental competence to stand trial and there are but few judicial decisions
on the question. Consequently, the courts have dealt with suspected cases in various ways as
their judgment of the particular case dictated. The importance of uniform treatment is thus
made apparent.... The bill is the result of prolonged, patient, and painstaking study and
reflection by a constituted committee of judges ... and representatives of the Attorney
General. Its early enactment would be of substantial assistance in clarifying a constantly
recurring and vexatious problem." H. R. RE. No. 1309, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1949).
2 § 4245. Mental incompetency undisclosed at trial.
"Whenever the Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall certify that a person convicted of
an offense against the United States has been examined by the board of examiners referred
Each federal prison has a board of examiners authorized by section 4241.
These boards were established in 1930 to "examine any inmate of the institu-
tion alleged to be insane or of unsound mind or otherwise defective and report
their findings and the facts on which they are based to the Attorney General." 3
The Attorney General is then authorized by section 4241 to order that the
prisoner be hospitalized. The legislative history of section 4245 indicates that
Congress intended that the board's role in the procedure for vacating sen-
tences should be no more than a collateral consequence of the examination
held pursuant to section 4241.4 It would appear that the new section was en-
acted to protect the rights of prisoners whose convictions were improper but
whose rights would not otherwise be asserted. Before the enactment of section
4245, most of these prisoners could have been discovered in examinations
pursuant to section 4241; but the prison boards had no formal means of com-
municating to a court that there was cause to believe that the prisoners prob-
to in title 18, United States Code, section 4241 and that there is probable cause to believe
that such person was mentally incompetent at the time of his trial, provided the issue of
mental competency was not raised and determined before or during said trial, the Attorney
General shall transmit the report of the board of examiners and the certificate of the Director
of the Bureau of Prisons to the clerk of the district court wherein the conviction was had.
Whereupon the court shall hold a hearing to determine the mental competency of the accused
in accordance with the provisions of section 4244 above, and with all the powers therein
granted. In such hearing the certificate of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall be
prima facie evidence of the facts and conclusions certified therein. If the court shall find that
the accused was mentally incompetent at the time of his trial, the court shall vacate the judg-
ment of conviction and grant a new trial."
3 § 4241. Examination and transfer to hospital.
"A board of examiners for each Federal penal and correctional institution shall consist of
(1) a medical officer appointed by the warden or superintendent of the institution; (2) a
medical officer appointed by the Attorney General; and (3) a competent expert in mental
diseases appointed by the Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service.
"Such board shall examine any inmate of the institution alleged to be insane or of un-
sound mind or otherwise defective and report their findings and the facts on which they are
based to the Attorney General.
"The Attorney General, upon receiving such report may direct the warden or superin-
tendent or other official having custody of the prisoner to cause such prisoner to be removed
to the United States hospital for defective delinquents or to any other institution authorized
by law to receive insane persons charged with or convicted of offenses against the United
States, there to be kept until, in the judgment of the superintendent of said hospital, the
prisoner shall be restored to sanity or health or until the maximum sentence, without deduc-
tion for good time or commutation of sentence, shall have been served."
4 A statement of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons is set out in the House report.
It was his understanding that section 4245 "provides for a hearing and authorizes a new
trial for any person who, during service of sentence, is certified by prison officials to be of
unsound mind and that such condition probably existed either at the time of commission of
the offense or time of trial. Based upon past experience, the percentage of convicts in the
first classification, is large enough to justify the belief that mental disturbances of a psychotic
nature existed at the time of the trial." H. R. REP. No. 1309, supra note 1, at 2-3.
Judge Bazelon emphasizes this legislative history in his opinion in Fooks v. United
States, 245 F.2d 629, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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ably had been convicted improperly. Section 4245 apparently was intended to
provide a formal channel of communication.
Section 4245 probably does provide an effective channel of communication
when the question of past competency would not have been raised but for an
examination pursuant to section 4241. However, some courts have gone fur-
ther and assumed that section 4245 provides a procedure for a prisoner who is
actively seeking to petition a court for relief. The procedural difficulties arising
in the cases in which this assumption has been made indicate that the channel
of communication provided by Congress is not adequate if the section is inter-
preted to apply to prisoners actively seeking relief. The cases discussed in this
comment will illustrate these procedural difficulties. Since conflicting inter-
pretations of the procedure authorized by the section have not been clearly
set out by the courts, it will be helpful to outline several possible interpreta-
tions of section 4245 before considering the cases themselves.
Under the interpretation supported by the legislative history no prisoner
could petition pursuant to section 4245 for an examination concerning his past
competence to stand trial.5 This is probably the most practical interpretation
since it avoids the problems of administrative discretion that would arise if the
board should refuse to grant an examination or if the Director should refuse to
certify "probable cause." 6 A section intended to apply to prisoners actively
seeking relief should describe the procedure that the prisoner is to follow in
petitioning the board. It should also state the consequences of denial of relief
by the Director. Section 4245 does none of these; it merely provides a proce-
dure for the Director to follow after he has found probable cause.7
If it is assumed that prisoners may actively petition for relief pursuant to
section 4245, then the question arises to what extent this right to petition is
limited to certain prisoners by the phrase "examined by the board of examiners
referred to in ... section 4241." If the phrase means "examined pursuant to
section 4241," then the right to petition is limited to prisoners who have been
foundmentallyill pursuant to section 4241.8 If the phrase means only that"the
5 This interpretation is supported by the legislative history in that the role of the prison
officials was there emphasized. There is nothing in the report indicating that a prisoner's
right to petition was considered. H. R. Rm. No. 1309, supra note 1, passim.
6 Under section 4245 the certificate of probable cause "shall be prima facie evidence of
the facts and conclusions certified therein." If prisoners are allowed to petition under section
4245 and relief is denied by the prison officials, the question arises whether the denial consti-
tutes "prima facie evidence" sufficient to deny a hearing pursuant to section 2255 of title 28.
See text infra at note 20.
7 The section begins with the Director's first step in his procedure: "Whenever the Direc-
tor ... shall certify ... " See text of statute supra at note 2.
3 This interpretation is supported by the legislative history only to the extent that the
Director's statement referred to prisoners found "to be of unsound mind." See note 4
supra,
examining board is referred to in section 4241," then any prisoner may petition
for relief pursuant to section 4245.9
The primary function of the prison board of examiners is to determine the
present state of a prisoner's mental health.10 Evidence as to the prisoner's past
should be important to the board only to the extent that it aids in the deter-
mination of his present mental condition. The board should not be required
to make a retroactive determination based only on evidence concerning the
prisoner's past mental condition. This information is equally available to a
court-appointed examining board.11
If prisoners are allowed to petition for relief under section 4245 without a
prior section 4241 finding of present mental illness, the operation of section
4245 would depend upon section 4241 only in that the examining board is
authorized by the earlier section. Under this interpretation, the purpose for
which the prison boards were created in 193012 would not limit their role under
section 4245.
9 It might be argued that there is an intermediate interpretation which would require that
a prisoner be examined pursuant to section 4241 but not that he be found mentally ill. The
words of section 4245 support this interpretation. (Under section 4245 the Director certifies
that the prisoner has been "examined" by the board; he does not certify that he has been
found mentally ill.) However, it is difficult to support this intermediate interpretation as
clearly distinct from the interpretation which allows prisoners to petition regardless of
whether a section 4241 examination has been held. A prisoner who had been denied a 4245
examination on the ground that a 4241 examination is a necessary condition could then
petition for a 4241 examination. This examination would have to be granted, thus satisfying
the condition because section 4241 states that the board "shall examine any... [prisoner]
alleged to be insane or of unsound mind or otherwise defective." It seems unreasonable for a
court to hold that these words do not grant a right to petition while at the same time holding
that such a right can be inferred from the words of section 4245, which describes only the
procedure that the Director is to follow.
There is a practical argument for limiting the right to petition to prisoners who have
been found mentally ill under section 4241. The question of a prisoner's right to petition
for a section 4241 examination has never been directly raised. It has however been held
that courts may not interfere with procedures taken pursuant to section 4241. Rosheisen v.
Steele, 193 F.2d 273 (8th Cir. 1951) (a prisoner, who had been transferred to a mental hos-
pital under section 4241, asserted his sanity in order to get the benefit of a deduction for
"good time"-a deduction which is denied prisoners who are transferred under section
4241).
Although the rule against court interference with section 4241 proceedings seems to sup-
port the intermediate interpretation, it, in fact, argues against the intermediate case in that
its general rule of the autonomy of prison officials should apply equally to section 4245.
Thus, if the analysis is pursued to its logical conclusion, prisoners would not be able to
petition for relief under either section. If, however, they are allowed to petition under section
4241, they should be able to do so under section 4245.
It is difficult to distinguish these interpretations on the basis of the legislative history be-
cause there is no indication that prisoner initiation was intended in any case.
10 See 28 U.S.C. § 4241, set out in note 3 supra. The original establishment of the boards
in 1930, 46 Stat. 272, was part of"An Act to establish a hospital for defective delinquents."
46 Stat. 270 (1930).
11 Such a board could be appointed, at the discretion of the court, in a proceeding pur-
suant to section 2255 of title 28. See text at notes 14 & 15 infra.
12 See note 10 supra.
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In the cases discussed in this comment, the courts have assumed that a
prisoner may petition pursuant to section 4245. There has been no complete
discussion of the conflicting interpretations which arise if this assumption is
made. There is a possible explanation for the lack ofjudicial discussion of this
aspect of the interpretation of section 4245: the question has so far arisen only
indirectly in cases where relief has been sought under section 2255 of title
28 U.S.C. Section 2255 provides a general remedy for vacating improper sen-
tences without resort to habeas corpus.' 3 One of the particular grounds for
relief is the post-conviction allegation of incompetency at the time of the
trial.14
Two cases which seem to illustrate no more than questionable use of prece-
dent also illustrate the type of confusion that has resulted when an assumption
concerning the operation of section 4245 is a factor in the disposition of a peti-
tion under section 2255. In Hoskins v. United States15 the circuit court af-
firmed the denial of a motion to vacate which was based on the allegation that
the prisoner had been mentally incompetent at the time of his trial. The per
curiam disposition stated that the district court "lacked jurisdiction to hold
the hearing sought.., under section 4245... where there was no certificate
by the Director... certifying that there is probable cause.... ."16 It is not
clear whether the petitioner or the court characterized the petition as "under
section 4245." Since there was no Director's certificate, the court should have
treated the motion to vacate as a motion pursuant to section 2255.17
The Hoskins opinion refers without discussion to Cason v. United States.18
In Cason the petition was explicitly under section 2255. The prisoner's sole
allegation was that, as a matter of law, a plea of guilty may not be accepted
13 According to the reviser's note in the United States Code (28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958)):
"This section restates, clarifies and simplifies the procedure in the nature of the ancient
writ of error coram nobis. It provides an expeditious remedy for correcting erroneous sen-
tences without resort to habeas corpus."
The motion under 2255 is similar to coram nobis and to the section 4245 procedure in
that the potential hearing is before the court which sentenced the prisoner.
14 Bishop v. United States, 223 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1955). The circuit court denied a
motion under section 2255. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded to the
district court for a hearing on the competency of the prisoner at the time of his trial. 350
U.S. 961 (1956). Subsequent cases have limited Bishop to the narrow holding that relief is
available under section 2255 only if there has been a history of insanity prior to the trial.
See, e.g., Bistram v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 501 (D.N. Dak. 1960).
15 251 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1957).
16 Ibid.
17 In United States v. Mancuso, 152 F. Supp. 355, 359 (W.D. La. 1957), the court, in
granting relief under section 2255 stated:
"Here the Director of the Bureau of Prisons did not certify that movant had been ex-
amined by the board of examiners referred to in 18 U.S.C. 4241. Hence the provisions of
4245 properly may not be invoked by movant. However, he clearly was entitled to seek relief
under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 2255 and the matter is treated as if such an application had
been made."
18 220 F.2d 510 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied 349, U.S. 966 (1955).
unless inquiry is made concerning the defendant's mental competency. That
contention clearly cannot be supported since it would put the burden on the
trial court to make a finding concerning competency even if the question were
not raised by counsel or by the suspect behavior of the defendant. Thus the
denial of a hearing pursuant to section 2255 was proper since that section pro-
vides: "Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively
show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall... grant a
prompt hearing... ."'19 After fully supporting its denial of the section 2255
hearing, the court in Cason concluded by stating, in dictum, that a hearing
would be granted if a certificate were filed under section 4245. The lack of the
certificate had nothing to do with the denial of the hearing under section 2255,
but the Hoskins court seemed to rely on this unnecessary reference to section
4245 as support for its apparent holding that a 4245 certificate is necessary to
give the court jurisdiction whenever the prisoner alleges his past incompetency
to stand trial.
Thus in Hoskins there was no support for the court's implicit assumption
that all motions to vacate claiming incompetency at the time of the trial must
be treated as section 4245 motions. Some courts, however, have held explicitly
that relief is not available under section 2255 because section 4245 provides an
exclusive remedy. In United States v. Meadows2o the prisoner contended that
he had been found mentally incompetent in another judicial hearing. Thus the
records of the case did not "conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no
relief." However, the court refused to grant a hearing under section 2255 be-
cause the prisoner had "misconceived the procedure he should follow in
raising the question of his mental competency" to stand trial.21 In outlining
the procedure that the prisoner should have followed, the court assumed that
the prisoner could petition for an examination pursuant to section 4245.
Gordon v. United States22 is a more recent case holding that section 4245
precludes relief under section 2255 on the ground of incompetency to stand
trial. The Gordon opinion does not discuss the point as clearly as Meadows23 but
the facts of the Gordon case suggest an important distinction. Unlike Mead-
ows, Gordon had been found mentally ill in a 4241 examination. Therefore, it
would have been possible to apply to the Gordon case the interpretation of sec-
19 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958).
20 140 F. Supp. 184 (W.D. Mich. 1955). The court of appeals adopted the opinion of the
district court and reasserted that the prisoner may apply to the Director under section 4245.
235 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1956).
21140 F. Supp. at 188.
22 250 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1957).
23 All that the Gordon court said on this point was: "The language of the section is too
clear to leave any doubt that the only remedy such a one has is the remedy provided for
in Section 4245. All the cases so hold and citation of authority is deemed unnecessary."
250 F.2d at 678.
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tion 4245 which allows the prisoner to petition only if he has been found
mentally ll pursuant to section 4241. Under this restrictive interpretation, it is
difficult to accept the broad rule of the Gordon case that section 4245 provides
exclusive relief.24 The opinion in Gordon lays down the broad rule without dis-
cussing any justification other than the words of the statute. Only the facts of
the case suggest that the findings of a section 4241 examination should be
available to a court attempting to make a determination of past competency to
stand trial.
The suggestion which is implied in the particular facts of the Gordon case is
made explicitly in Krupnick v. United States.25 The petitioner sought to have
his sentence vacated under section 2255 on the ground that the trial court had
improperly refused to grant him a competency hearing at the time of his trial.
The circuit court reversed the denial of the petition and ordered a nunc pro
tunc determination of the petitioner's competence to stand trial. In ordering
this determination the circuit court said:
In initial approach to the problem, the court may desire to have the government's
psychiatrists, by whom appellant is now being treated, furnish it with a certificate
under... section 4245, as to whether or not "there is probable cause to believe that
such person was mentally incompetent at the time of his trial." 6
Under none of the suggested interpretations does section 4245 provide clearly
for a certificate of "no probable cause." The circuit court's assumption that
such a certificate may be requested by a district court illustrates two important
points. First, that section 4245 has been read as authorizing a district court to
order examinations which are a part of prison administration. Second, that
the assumption that a certificate of "no probable cause" may be requested is
based on the courts' view that they should have the benefit of relevant findings
made by prison officials.
Section 4245 does not clearly set out a procedure to assure that the relevant
findings of prison officials are communicated to courts. The failure to provide
for a certificate of "no probable cause" has particularly important conse-
quences since the board's finding of "no probable cause" must be transmitted
to the courts informally or by negative implication. In Bistram v. United
States2 7 the court assumed from the absence of a certificate that there was no
probable cause. 28 However, the absence of a 4245 certificate after a 4241 ex-
24 A strong argument can be made that the holding of a 4241 examination should never
limit 2255 relief when the question is one of incompetency to stand trial, since 2255 relief can
be granted when the incompetency is clearly temporary. See, e.g., Coates v. United States,
273 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Pledgor v. United States, 272 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1959) (in-
capacity due to influence of narcotics).
25 264 F.2d 213 (8th Cir. 1959). It is not clear whether Krupnick had been found mentally
ill. He was "under diagnosis as to his mental competency." Id. at 218.
26 Id. at 218.
27180 F. Supp. 501 (D.N. Dak. 1960).
28 "This court ordered, on September 16, 1959, that ultimate disposition of petitioner's
amination does not necessarily imply a conclusion of the board or the Director
that there is no probable cause. Even if it is unlikely that a court will deny a
hearing under section 2255 relying solely on the negative implication resulting
from the absence of a 4245 certificate, 29 the channels of communication should
be made more certain.
The uncertainty arising from the lack of adequate channels of communica-
tion is further illustrated by Seidner v. United States.30 There the district court
had denied two petitions without a hearing, holding that neither motion al-
leged a ground upon which relief could be granted. The circuit court appointed
an amicus curiae after learning that the prisoner was incarcerated in a mental
institution run by the Bureau of Prisons. The amicus raised for the first time
the question of the prisoner's competence at the time of his trial. The circuit
court ordered the Director to show cause why he had not invoked section
4245. The Director stated that he had examined the report of the board and
found no probable cause. The court discharged the order, but decided to allow
a judicial hearing despite the Director's indication that there was no probable
cause. 31 The necessity for ordering the Director to show cause why action was
not taken under section 4245 indicates the weakness of a procedure which
provides for a finding of no probable cause only as an inference from the cir-
motion be reserved pending the filing with this Court within ninety (90) days of that date, by
the Attorney General of the United States, the report of the Board of Examiners prepared
pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 4241, and the certificate of probable cause, if indicated, by
the Director of the Bureau of Prisons as contemplated by Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 4245. The
Attorney General has not filed a report of the Board of Examiners prepared pursuant to
Sec. 4241 nor a certificate of probable cause as contemplated by Sec. 4245. From this the
Court can only conclude that the petitioner's mental condition did not and does not warrant
that any action be taken pursuant to either of the above cited Sections." Id. at 503-04. (Em-
phasis added.)
29 For example, the district court's conclusion in Bistram (see note 28 supra) did not de-
pend upon the negative implication from the lack of a 4245 certificate. The opinion begins:
"The matter now before the Court illustrates the constant and vexing problems arising
out of the abuse of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255, by criminals lawfully imprisoned who, by repeated
and successive motions brought under that Section, impose an unnecessarily onerous burden
upon an already overburdened federal judiciary." Id. at 502.
30 260 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
31 In a footnote to his concurring opinion, Judge Bazelon suggested a possible reason
why the Director had refused to certify probable cause. He quoted from the report of the
Classification Committee of the Medical Center to which the prisoner had been transferred
pursuant to section 4241:
"The Classification Committee considered the possibility of referring subject [appellant]
to the Board of Examiners for consideration of processing under Section 4245; however,
since it has been nine months since his trial and sentence, the Committee questioned the
wisdom of referring this case back to the court." Id. at 735 n.2. (Emphasis by the court.)
The Director may have had other reasons for refusing to certify; but it is clear that the
Classification Committee's report, which confused problems of medical diagnosis with the
prisoner's legal rights, did not, in the court's view, constitute a sufficient basis for his decision-
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cunstances. In this case, the court did not accept the Director's decision, but it
did not criticize his failure to act.
In Clatterbuck v. United States32 the judicial attitude toward the prison
authorities was more disapproving. After asserting that the legislation on
mental defectives had not been working as expected, Judge Washington com-
mented: "This court has on an earlier occasion in Clatterbuck's history, as
Judge Bazelon points out, called the attention of the authorities to the provi-
sions of section 4241. It may not be out of order to remind them of it once
again."3 3 Since the section 4245 examination is directly related to the work of
the courts, it can be argued that it is proper for courts to order such an ex-
amination. However, judicial comment concerning the failure to hold a 4241
examination seems much less desirable.
It seems clear, from the words of the section and from the legislative history,
that section 4245 was not intended to apply to prisoners actively seeking relief.
However, the courts which have assumed the broader application have a basis
for this assumption. It seems sensible that the prison board should communi-
cate its findings and recommendations to the courts in any case where these
findings are relevant to the determination of past competence to stand trial. It
should make no difference that, in some cases, the prisoner is initiating the
section 4245 proceeding. However, legislative change is necessary for a clear
statement of the procedure to be followed by the prisoner. Any suggestions for
legislative change must take into account an important distinction between
section 4241 and section 4245. Section 4241 has primarily a medical purpose
of providing proper care for mentally ill prisoners; the section 4245 procedure
leads to a legal conclusion concerning competency to stand trial. Any new
channels of communication must include safeguards so that the medical em-
phasis in the examination and report will not distort the legal conclusion.3 4
32 266 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
33 Id. at 900.
34 See, e.g., note 31 supra.
CONTROL OF THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW:
SCOPE OF INHERENT JUDICIAL POWER
Many state supreme courts, relying upon the separation of powers clause
of the state constitution, have asserted a broad power to regulate the practice
of law.' Some courts have claimed that the power is exclusive and that,
1 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in In re Bledsoe, 186 Okla. 264, 97 P.2d 556, 557
(1939), explicitly acknowledged that the source of judicial power in this area was the
general separation of powers clause. "There is no provision of the Constitution which
specifically fixes the authority for determining the qualifications for admission to the
bar in either the legislative or the judicial branch of government. The only applicable
